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Since the breakdown of the Summit Conference in Paris the Soviets have clearly embarked on a major propaganda and agitational campaign with the United States as its chief target. It seems designed to increase international tension, provoke and encourage disorders wherever possible and has involved a wide range of threats, provocation and blackmail. In the field of action the Soviet Government has broken off the disarmament negotiations on June 27 when conceivably with new Western proposals forthcoming, of which the Soviet Government was aware, an opportunity for genuine progress might have presented itself. In addition, on July 1 the Soviets shot down a United States military plane over international waters.



In most respects this campaign has followed the previous cold war propaganda campaigns with one very important innovation. For the first time in its history the Soviet Union has asserted its willingness in recent weeks to give military support to any regime which seems to serve Soviet purposes, and to threaten atomic retaliation against any country which might take action against such regime. Such threats have been made in the case of Cuba with reference to the United States, and in more generalized terms in the case of the Congo. These threats are probably merely part of the current war of nerves designed in the first instance to weaken the prestige and leadership of the United States, to separate it from its allies, and in particular to pose as champion of all colonial

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or former colonial peoples in the world. Even though there may be no serious intention of acting militarily on these threats, they do appear to enunciate a new doctrine with the Soviet Union coming close to asserting the right of military intervention in any part of the world when it suits its purposes to do so. This is undoubtedly in part a reflection of the Soviet belief in its present military power.

It is this aspect of current Soviet behavior which requires something more in response than mere words. Some form of action should be taken to bring calmly and coldly to the attention of the Soviet Union the dangers of its current attitude. While they may have no intention of acting on these threats, it is nevertheless possible that the Soviets if they feel that this propaganda campaign is succeeding might progressively commit themselves in future courses of action in the military field which would be extremely difficult for them to disavow if ever put to the test. In addition, we must consider the effect of this Soviet campaign of threat and blackmail on other countries, particularly the uncommitted areas of the world. If this campaign seems to be proceeding without any strong response on the part of the United States, it might well create the impression that the Soviets are in fact in total command of the situation and that the United States is unable or unwilling to devise any appropriate counter.


In surveying the fields in which the United States could take action which might have a salutary and sobering effect upon the

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Soviet Union and offset any psychological disadvantageous effects of this campaign in certain parts of the world, it would seem that an increase in our military and mutual security budgets through a request for supplementary appropriations in the August session of Congress would be the best for these purposes. It would fall into the category of action and not words; it could be presented in the most sober and calm manner in order to avoid any impression of panic or belief in the imminence of war but would serve as evidence of American determination not to be browbeaten by Soviet threats or blackmail, and a very timely reminder that the United States has the resources and will if necessary to add in the future even more appreciably to our military defenses if Soviet behavior renders it necessary.



It could be presented to Congress in a very simple message, merely stating that since presentation of the United States military budget and military assistance part of the Mutual Security Act, the world situation due to Soviet actions had considerably worsened, listing if necessary the specific acts and threats which the Soviet Union has indulged in since the collapse of the Summit Conference. This could be set against the backdrop of the calm attitude of the United States and its allies which makes absolutely clear that the responsibility for the increase in international tension is due solely to Soviet actions and attitudes during this period. The ideal thing would be for the Congress to authorize the President to spend at his discretion up to
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order to place our forces in a special state of readiness to deal with

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any contingency that may arise, and to utilize a portion thereof for the increase of the defense systems of our allies and, if conceivable in Congressional terms, a certain portion for emergency economic aid in the event of special need.

The exact Soviet purposes in mounting this extreme campaign is not entirely clear. It most probably does not forecast Soviet military action, but on the other hand the element of uncertainty is sufficient to justify placing ourselves and our allies in a special state of readiness quite apart from the salutary effect such action on our part should have on the Soviet leadership.



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